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Introduction

The 2014 FIFA World Cup (FWC) will be played in 12 Brazilian host cities from June 12 – July 13, with 32 national teams playing a total of 64 matches. Brazil has experience hosting large international events including the 2007 Pan American Games, the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup (FCC), World Youth Day, and annual Carnival and New Year’s celebrations. However, the scope and scale of the FWC will far surpass previous efforts. World Cup organizers are expecting 600,000 foreign visitors and three million Brazilians traveling internally during the tournament.

Major events are often viewed as a potential platform for activists, protestors, and terrorist groups to amplify their message while the world is watching. U.S. private sector concerns leading up to the FWC include opportunistic street crime, protest activity, potential labor strikes, logistical challenges, and cyber crime. Untested telecommunication and transportation infrastructure may also pose challenges for OSAC constituents.

The following assessment is intended to provide OSAC constituents with an understanding of safety and security, logistical, medical, and host nation planning efforts surrounding the FWC. Host city assessments provide an overview of crime, civil unrest, transportation, stadium, and medical information for all 12 cities.

Security Concerns

Crime

Crime is a serious, pervasive concern in Brazil. Brazilian police and media report that overall crime rates are higher in World Cup host cities than in rural areas. According to a recently published United Nations report on international homicide, Brazil’s murder rate is more than four times higher than that of the United States, and rates for other violent crimes are similarly high. Violence linked to organized crime groups, drug trafficking gangs, and police shootings account for a large share of homicides in Brazil.

Travelers will encounter a substantial array of criminal risks in Brazil, but the most prevalent security risk during the FWC will be street crime. Opportunistic street crime -- pick-pocketing, mugging, armed robbery, car theft/carjacking, home burglaries, and ATM/credit card fraud -- are predominant. Other crimes of opportunity that pose considerable risks to visitors are express kidnapping and sexual assault. While the risk is greater during the evening and at night, street crime also occurs during the day, and safer areas of cities are not immune. Incidents of theft on city buses are frequent.

Crime rates in all 12 host cities vary and represent unique local trends. The past five years has seen a shift in national crime trends, with an increase of violent crime rates in Brazil’s northeast region, encompassing the cities of Fortaleza, Salvador, Manaus, and Recife and a decrease in the southeastern cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. While one city may have a higher homicide rate and another may have a greater number of armed robbery incidents, the overall severity of all criminal risks should be accepted as uniform in all cities. For example, if Rio de Janeiro has a higher number of muggings than Manaus, the same security countermeasures employed by security professionals and practiced by
travelers should be applied in both cities. Therefore, a more holistic approach to identifying localized security risks - like highlighting dangerous areas (e.g. favelas) and known protest zones - will offer a more accurate risk assessment in individual host cities than comparative crime trend analysis. More information on city-specific security challenges can be found in the host city assessment appendix section of this report.

The incidence of crime against tourists is greater near beaches, hotels, discotheques, bars, nightclubs, and other tourist destinations. For example, in late 2013, an uptick in mass beach robberies (known locally as arrastoes) on popular Rio de Janeiro beaches like Copacabana, Leblon, Ipanema, and Arpoador along the Zona Sul tourist area prompted the U.S. Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro to issue a Security Message to U.S. citizens warning of an increase in criminal incidents in tourist areas.

Individuals perceived to be wealthy may assume a greater risk profile than others. In airports, hotel lobbies, bus stations, and other public places, pick pocketing and the theft of hand-carried luggage and laptop computers are common. “Good Samaritan” scams are common. If a tourist looks lost or seems to be having trouble communicating, a seemingly innocent bystander offering help may actually be a participant in a scam.

FIFA Fan Fests are official spaces for the public viewing of the tournament’s matches. All FIFA Fan Fests are free and open to the public. All FWC games will be shown at each Fan Fest location, but visitors should expect a larger attendance during Brazil national team matches. Fan Fest locations will broadcast matches on televisions and offer food/beverage services to spectators. Most FIFA Fan Fest locations are strategically positioned in busy, centralized areas of the host city and could provide target-rich environments for thieves. The availability of alcoholic beverages may also inhibit rational decision-making and present additional risk for sexual assault.

Credit card skimming (the illegal copying of a credit card’s data for monetary theft) is another widespread cause of credit card fraud in Brazil. Skimmers can be placed in point-of-sale terminals, ticket machines, and ATMs to read card information from the magnetic strip. Compromised ATMs also rely on small, pinhole-sized cameras to record PIN codes associated with debit cards.

Express kidnapping is a security concern while traveling in Brazil. Express kidnapping is sometimes referred to locally as “relampago express” (lightning kidnapping) in Portuguese or “quicknapping.” They usually occur while an individual is withdrawing money from an ATM or shortly thereafter. ATM users are abducted at gun- or knife-point and driven to several other ATMs to withdraw cash before being released.

While the ability of Brazilian police to help recover stolen property is limited, the U.S. Department of State strongly advises American victims of crime to obtain a "boletim de ocorrencia" (police report) at a police station for any possessions that are lost or stolen.

Given the high levels of crime and violence in most unpacified shanty towns, or “favelas,” the U.S. State Department strongly advises against traveling into favelas. However, this restriction does not include commonly used transit routes that pass near or through favelas. Favelas are ubiquitous in Rio de Janeiro and an estimated 1,000 favela communities are interspersed through the city. Favelas can range in size between 1,000 to 100,000 people and often neighbor some of the wealthiest neighborhoods in the
South Zone (Zona Sul) like Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon. For decades, there was no government authority or permanent police presence in favelas to provide public services and administer the rule of law. Shortly after winning the bid to host the 2014 FWC, the Rio de Janeiro government spearheaded a long-term policing and social development strategy in the favelas. This paradigm shift in public security policy marked the start of the favela pacification program. Since 2008, the favela pacification program has installed a permanent police force in over 30 Rio de Janeiro favelas. The most recent favela pacification effort occurred in March when the police and military entered a community of 15 small favelas called Complexo da Maré in northern Rio de Janeiro. Favelas that do not have permanent security forces under the pacification program are considered “unpacified.” OSAC’s 2012 whitepaper report on Rio de Janeiro’s favela pacification program offers a more in-depth analysis on the effectiveness and operational intricacies of the program.

As a result of the high demand for hotel rooms and soaring room rates, favelas have become attractive low-cost lodging alternatives to mainstream hotels in Rio de Janeiro. Even in “pacified” favelas with police; hostels, campsites, and homestays will not offer comparable levels of security one would expect from a traditional hotel. For example, rooms may not have locks on doors or windows. Entrenched criminal gangs and opportunistic criminals may seek to take advantage of tourists, especially in the evenings because street lighting is poor. Getting lost in favelas is also fairly easy because roads are not usually marked.

**Personal Security Best Practices**

Travelers to any of the 12 FWC host cities can help deter such risks by practicing precautionary security measures as a part of their daily routines.

- Do not carry or wear valuable items that will attract the attention of thieves. Visitors are encouraged to "dress down" when in public; avoid carrying valuables and wearing jewelry or expensive watches; and conceal cash. If you carry a smart phone or camera, conceal it until you arrive at your destination.
- Do not physically resist any robbery attempt. If confronted by an assailant displaying a lethal weapon or threatening violence, victims should turn over valuables quickly and without comment. Many criminals will not hesitate to use violence. Statistics show that resistance can lead to severe consequences, such as injury or death.
- Visitors should keep a copy of their passport with them while in public and leave passports in a hotel safe or another secure location. Visitors should also carry proof of health insurance.
- Bar patrons should always maintain control of personal effects. Drink responsibly and take precautions to avoid the risk of food/drink being compromised or laced.
- If possible, avoid city buses because of pick-pocketing and armed robbery concerns.
- Only use taxis at taxi stands or have your hotel call one for you directly.
- Avoid driving alone, especially at night. Be alert while waiting at stop lights or intersections in the evening. Keep car windows closed and doors locked at all times. Keep valuables out of sight.
- Be aware of the street environment and avoid contact with those looking for potential crime targets. Seek a safer location. Go into a store, bank, or simply cross the street and alter your route.
• Use well-traveled, well-illuminated streets. Always plan your routes before you leave for your final destination.
• Traveling in groups of two or more persons appears to have a positive effect on deterring criminals.
• Do not answer your hotel room door until you positively confirm who is on the other side. Look out the peephole or call the front desk to confirm the visitor.
• Do not walk on beaches or in parks after dark. Assaults are common in these areas.
• Visitors using credit or ATM cards as payment, or to withdraw cash, should routinely monitor bank records during and after their visit. Visitors should only use well-lit ATMs in heavily trafficked areas, like a hotel lobbies and airports, and be alert at all times when entering and exiting banks with ATMs.
• It is not recommended that travelers lodge in or travel to favelas.

Protests

Before June 2013, popular discontent toward the Brazilian government rarely resulted in public demonstrations. The largest anti-government demonstration occurred in 1992 against then-President Fernando Collor de Mello, when several thousand student protestors demanded his resignation because of corruption allegations.

On June 13, 2013, small-scale protests spearheaded by angry Sao Paulo residents against a rise in bus fare devolved into a nationwide protest movement. Protestors rallied behind a variety of causes ranging from corruption, education, poor healthcare, and government spending on major sporting events like the FCC and FWC. On June 20, nationwide protests occurred in 100 Brazilian cities, with an estimated one million demonstrators taking to the streets.

The majority of protest activity proceeded peacefully, with a small group vandalizing storefronts, banks, and public property and looting supermarkets and small shops. Protestors clashed with police in most major cities, and security forces deployed tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds. Four protesters died, and hundreds were injured during the demonstrations. Brazilian security forces were relatively effective at controlling protest activity around FCC stadiums by setting up security cordons and allowing only ticketed spectators access to the stadiums.

Protest groups -- the Movimento Passo Livre (MPL), Movimento de Trabalhadores Sem Teto (MTST), Copa pra quem? (The Cup for Whom?), União Nacional dos Estudantes, and VemPraRuaBrazil -- rapidly mobilized via social media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter. While June 20 saw the height of protest activity, demonstrations continued through the duration of the FCC, including before the final match at Rio de Janeiro’s Maracana stadium. For an overview of the FCC and its impact on OSAC constituents, please see the July 1, 2013 OSAC Confederations Cup Daily Report.

Public support for prolonged, large-scale anti-governments protests quickly dissipated as international attention shifted away from the tournament, and protestors fatigued. A decrease in public support for protests, gleaned from a Datafolha survey published in February 2014, appears to correlate with the long-term drop in overall protest activity since June 2013 when 81 percent of respondents were in favor of the demonstrations. By February 2014, the number fell to 52 percent. Just 32 percent support
demonstrations during the 2014 FWC. This decrease is likely the result of violence being injected into otherwise peaceful demonstrations by anarchist groups.

**Black Bloc**

Nevertheless, intermittent protests in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro continue and have turned violent because of infiltration by anarchist elements. Protestors using Black Bloc anarchist tactics often instigate violent confrontations with riot police and vandalize property. The general Brazilian protest population condemns Black Bloc-related violence, and Black Bloc protestors represent a very small percent of actual demonstrators. Peaceful protestors have occasionally made efforts to distinguish themselves from Black Bloc elements by splitting demonstration routes to avoid linkages and associations.

In September 2013, Black Bloc protestors infiltrated Brazilian Independence Day celebrations, and they hijacked a peaceful teacher’s union demonstration in October. In February 2014, a demonstration over public transport prices at the central train station in downtown Rio de Janeiro turned violent, as riot police clashed with protestors, and ticket booths were destroyed. Furthermore, a cameraman filming the protests died after being struck in the head by a homemade firework allegedly thrown by Black Bloc anarchists.

Black Bloc protestors have also held independent rallies, often posted in advance through various social media platforms. Black Bloc activists have expressed their intent be an active element in the 2014 FWC protest landscape. More information on Black Bloc protest tactics and motivations can be found in OSAC’s Black Bloc anarchism report.

**Rolezinhos**

While Black Bloc anarchist protestors have instilled fear across Brazil for their violent tactics, the emergence of a new trend in peaceful protest called a *rolezinho*, or “little stroll,” has also raised concerns. In January, groups of teenagers mobilized en masse at shopping centers throughout suburban Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasilia. The rolezinho gatherings have been large at times – estimates have reached up to 3,000 people – and create a raucous in shopping malls that are usually calm and demure. Participants usually play loud music, shout slogans about consumerism, and purposefully disturb shoppers walking around the mall. Rolezinhos tend to remain peaceful; however, police officers used tear gas and rubber bullets on a crowd in Shopping Metrô Itaquera in Sao Paulo earlier this year. Rolezinhos should not pose a significant security risk to travelers during the FWC, but outsiders unfamiliar with this form of protest may become anxious.

**FWC Protest Outlook**

OSAC constituents operating in any of the Brazilian host cities during the World Cup should anticipate an increase in the frequency of public demonstrations. Protest organizers are already promoting anti-World Cup and anti-government protest marches on social media networks, and the government announced that up to 170,000 police, military troops, and emergency response personnel will be on-hand to respond to civil unrest prior to and during the tournament.
While President Dilma Rousseff and her government have made attempts to address some protestor grievances – introducing thousands of Cuban doctors to meet healthcare needs in poor areas and allocating future oil profits to public education – demonstrations over the same political, economic, and social issues persist. The billions of taxpayer dollars spent on updating and building new stadiums for the 2014 FWC – and the hundreds of millions of dollars already allocated to the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro – sharply contrast with the dire state of Brazil’s public services. Protestor disagreement with exorbitant government expenditures on the world’s largest and most popular sporting events will be compounded by a rare opportunity to amplify their concerns against the backdrop of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. While it is still too early to forecast the size, scope, location, and demographics of protests; demonstrations are very likely in most, if not all, FWC host cities.

**Terrorism**

There are no known indigenous terrorist groups in Brazil. Brazil is not targeted by any known radical groups; therefore, the threat of terrorism is generally considered low. However, international sporting events can offer terrorist groups and radical individuals an attractive target for a high-profile attack. Lone wolf terrorist attacks, similar to those at the Boston Marathon in 2013, are of most concern. Brazilian authorities worry about lone wolves – radicalized individuals without ties/assistance to any group and often unbeknown to law enforcement – carrying out unsophisticated attacks in crowded public areas. The most likely tactic would be through the use of low-intensity, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or firearms.

OSAC is not aware of any specific, credible terrorist threats to the FWC. However, the U.S. Department of State remains concerned about the continued threat of terrorist attacks and other violent actions against U.S. citizens and interests overseas and maintains a [Worldwide Caution](#).

**Transnational Terrorist Groups**

Brazil is not considered a target by Islamist extremist networks. In the past, there have been open-source reports suggesting that individuals in Brazil were linked to Middle East-based militant groups, but those reports were largely speculative. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a detained senior member of al-Qa’ida and the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, reportedly visited Brazil in the mid-1990s, but there is no information to suggest that al-Qa’ida has established a presence in Brazil. If there are any connections to transnational terrorist groups, it is likely confined to support functions, such as fundraising and money laundering, not planning or executing attacks in Brazil. The Tri-Border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay continues to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human trafficking; counterfeiting; pirated goods; and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations.

**Strikes and Labor Unrest**

Strike activity, or the threat of strike activity, is a common occurrence in the lead up to most major events. Such platforms offer considerable leverage for unions and public sector workers to negotiate
pay or benefit increases, as the reputation of the host nation is at stake. Strikes are common in Brazil and can cause temporary disruption to transportation, security, and other services on normal days. During the FWC tournament, these disruptions may be exacerbated.

Recent police strikes and protests have raised concerns. In mid-April, Military Police in the state of Bahia initiated a two-day, state-wide work stoppage to press their demands. Salvador, the state capital and a popular tourist and business destination, was affected the most, with 58 homicides, looting of businesses, and severe transportation challenges. Federal troops were called in to maintain order before the Military Police returned to work. Federal police have also staged protests in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo throughout the year and threatened a work stoppage during the FWC unless demands were met.

The successes of recent work stoppages may inspire other groups to follow suit. It is also possible that the Brazilian government, eager to have the tournament proceed without major challenges, will settle outstanding issues in time for the opening match. However, this is not guaranteed. The possibility for general strikes is real and, if timed right, could have a major impact on security, transportation, and other vital services prior to or during the FWC. Airline or public transportation strikes could create mass chaos; inadequate policing could lead to compromised security, as played out in Salvador, Bahia.

Most protests and general strikes are announced publically and in advance, which can help mitigate difficulties. However, OSAC constituents should factor potential labor strikes and work stoppages into their contingency planning in an effort to be prepared for worse-case scenarios.

**Hooliganism**

“Hooliganism” is the general term for fan violence typically associated with soccer. Such behavior can include planned fights between opposing fans, disruptive and violent behavior at matches, vandalism, and intimidation. Spots to watch out for hooliganism include stadiums (before, during, or after a match), public viewing sites, and bars.

Violent hooliganism can be found in Brazil, particularly at club-level matches. This behavior, spotlighted recently at Brazil’s first division league game in Joinville, is far less common during international tournaments. The demographics of spectators at international matches differ from those attending club-level events, with supporters tending to be wealthier and include more women and families. Hooliganism can flare up depending on the match. For example, tensions run high during any match between Brazil and Argentina. These historic rivals may not meet during the FWC, but given the proximity of the two countries and the notoriety of Argentina’s “barras bravas” football hooligans, Brazilian and Argentine authorities alike are keeping a close eye on ticket holders. Other countries -- England and Germany -- notorious for unruly fans are being watched closely.

In 2003, Brazilian authorities banned the sale of alcohol in stadiums in an effort to reduce violence between domestic rival soccer fans. However, President Rousseff signed a law permitting a temporary exception for the sale of alcohol during last year’s FCC and this year’s FWC matches.

While there was little to no fan violence during the FCC, several soccer riots have occurred since June 2013, resulting in multiple deaths. The most recent occurred in the FWC host city of Recife on May 1, when a toilet bowl thrown by unruly fans struck and killed an individual at Arruda Stadium.

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Information Security and Cyber Threats

Major events are attractive targets for cyber threat actors where OSAC constituent websites, network resources, electronic devices, and sensitive information have been targeted during past major events. The FWC will present especially lucrative and advantageous opportunities for cyber criminals and “hacktivists” (hacker activists) in Brazil, an environment that leads Latin America in cyber crime and is a global hot spot for hackers. Additionally, as witnessed by last year’s FCC, Brazilians fused virtual and physical forms of protest. While some private sector and government organizations have strengthened their security posture over the past year, many OSAC constituent organizations and visitors may not be as resilient against data breaches, dedicated denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and cyber crime.

Cyber Crime

Brazil is not only the nation most affected by cyber crime regionally—which includes cyber fraud, identity theft, and money laundering—but also ranks among the worst affected globally, possessing the world’s second-highest number of online banking victims. In an attempt to stabilize a troubled economy, Brazil was a pioneer in the adoption of electronic and online financial systems in the 1980s. Today, the country has a large, robust banking community with the world’s second-largest ATM market. Overall Internet connectivity also experienced rapid expansion and speed, where today, about 40 percent of the population is online. In addition, Brazil has some of the largest computer and mobile phone markets, social media communities, and e-commerce sectors in the world. These factors, combined with the general lag in implementing and enforcing cyber security legislations and practices in both the public and private sectors, have rendered Brazil highly lucrative for both in-country and international cyber criminals.

Brazil-based cyber threat actors have produced numerous malware (malicious software) sets designed to infect computer devices in order to steal personal or financial data, including online banking credentials. While Brazilian banks and official FIFA websites have invested heavily in cyber security, most Brazilian companies and individuals do not possess or update critical protective software and lack basic cyber security practices. More than half of the country’s computers run pirated software that is unable to receive security updates that patch new vulnerabilities. As a result, malicious cyber activity usually targets dated flaws that could have easily been prevented with regular patching. OSAC recommends refraining from or being wary of conducting financial or other sensitive transactions over unfamiliar or potentially insecure networks, such as leased, Internet café, or hotel equipment. Some constituent organizations may also use Brazilian third-party companies, websites, or services that may not have a strong cyber security posture. Constituents should avoid using public or wireless networks, encrypt data communications, install only legitimate software and mobile applications, use anti-virus and anti-malware security software, and ensure that all software is up to date with the latest patches.

Cyber criminals primarily use a social engineering technique called “phishing,” where malicious actors send seemingly innocuous electronic communications that prompt victims to enter banking credentials or download malicious files that can potentially exfiltrate sensitive data. Phishing emails appear to come from legitimate companies but either contain links to fraudulent sites or have banking malware hidden in email attachments. In the past year, cyber criminals have added fake soccer team and celebrity fan
sites to their repertoire, capitalizing on the popularity of the FCC and FWC. Prominent cyber security firm Kaspersky said in February that it blocks between 40 and 50 new fraudulent websites tied to the World Cup theme every day. Phishing emails and social media posts with malicious links often use enticing “hooks” that promise shocking results, pictures, or videos. OSAC constituents are advised to only open emails from trusted entities, carefully review email headers to verify sender information, scan all attachments for viruses and malware, and to visit legitimate FIFA-related and media websites directly instead of clicking on any links in email messages.

Recently, Brazilian cyber criminals have begun using a relatively effective technique known as a “watering hole” attack. Hackers exploit vulnerabilities in popular legitimate websites, injecting code that redirects visitors to malicious websites. Brazilian hackers may attempt to turn FIFA-related, media, and/or local government websites into watering holes in order to target a wide audience. The best countermeasure for watering hole attacks is running up-to-date, patched software.

Travelers to Brazil should also be wary of scams, such as free, fake, and/or counterfeit event tickets. OSAC constituents should only purchase tickets or hospitality packages from authorized retailers; the official FIFA website is the best way to find legitimate merchants and vendors.

_**Hacktivism**_

Hacktivist groups will likely continue to conduct DDoS and website defacement attacks against Brazilian government, corporate sponsor, and other event organizer websites during the FWC, in an attempt to disrupt or disable online services. The primary hacktivist threat is “Anonymous Brazil,” a regional computer hacking group and self-proclaimed faction of the Anonymous hacktivist collective that has expressed its opposition to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and has been conducting malicious cyber activity since prior to last year’s FCC. The FWC offers an opportunity to target these sites in front of a global audience, bringing worldwide attention to domestic issues in Brazil while dissuading people from attending the event. To increase effectiveness, the group also aims to attract worldwide hacktivists, such as individuals from the greater Anonymous movement, to join their hacking operations.

_Dedicated Denial-of-Service Attacks and Defacements_

In 2012, Anonymous Brazil launched DDoS attacks against several of Brazil’s largest banks, including Banco do Brasil, Itaú Unibanco, and Bradesco, disabling their websites. Since 2013, the faction has conducted cyber attacks against ticket sales, accommodations, and other World Cup commerce sites. For example, in June, the official FIFA World Cup website was hacked, defaced, and replaced with a video. The group also hacked the Twitter account of VEJA, one of Brazil’s largest magazines, to spread its message to over three million of the publication’s followers. Anonymous-affiliated hacktivists went on a hacking spree from November until January, defacing many Brazilian state government websites and redirecting visitors to Anonymous-related web pages. They also reportedly compromised email accounts associated with the São Paulo government and conducted DDoS targeting against targeted public and private sector organizations.

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The higher the profile of an organization, the more ideal it is for selection as a target – especially by Anonymous-affiliated hacktivists. Anonymous Brazil has thus far conducted DDoS attacks with freely-available software tools that require a large number of participants to overwhelm websites. Since cyber security failures in 2013, bank and official FIFA websites have bolstered their security and have put stronger DDoS protections into place. In addition, websites of OSAC constituent organizations may lack sufficient DDoS protections and may not be so resistant to even lower-level attacks. Additionally, as with any cyber attack, smaller attacks could be part of a reconnaissance stage or distraction for larger attacks.

**Cyber-Enhanced Protests**

Digital activism entered the global spotlight in Brazil during the Confederations Cup timeframe, when online protests coincided with and supported the largest street protests in Brazil in over two decades. Brazilians are some of the most avid users of social media in the world; any socio-political unrest occurs in both the virtual and physical worlds.

Anonymous Brazil had an orchestrating role in the escalation of FCC protests. The group publicizes and coordinates its operations online via social media networks and Anonymous-affiliated online sites, which may be useful for monitoring hacktivist activities during the FWC. The group’s most popular sites include [www.anonymousbr4sil.net](http://www.anonymousbr4sil.net), [www.en.anonymous.brasil.com](http://www.en.anonymous.brasil.com) (English), and their associated Twitter and Facebook pages (@AnonymousBr4sil, @AnonBRNews, AnonymousBrasil, and AnonBRNews). Its most popularly-used Twitter hashtags for anti-World-Cup activities are #OpBoicoteACopa (Operation Boycott Cup), #BoicoteACopa, #NaoVaiTerCopa (there will not be a Cup). If the faction is able to attract international hacktivists, it is possible that #OpWorldCup may also be frequently used. Many Brazilian protestors unaffiliated with the Anonymous movement also use the #BoicoteACopa and #NaoVaiTerCopa hashtags.

**Industrial Control Systems**

More sophisticated hackers may also attempt to attack industrial control systems, which electronically control the power grid, communications, traffic lights, and other utilities. However, Anonymous Brazil has only been associated with relatively low-level attacks against the Brazilian government and World-Cup-affiliated organizations. In addition, hacktivists, especially Anonymous Brazil, tend to avoid targeting or causing harm to the general population. The Brazilian Army has reportedly bolstered cyber defenses to protect systems and services that are crucial to the safety of World Cup events; however, Brazil is one of the top countries in Latin America with notoriously-vulnerable Internet-facing industrial control systems, increasing the likelihood of access and/or infection. Even if other cyber threat actors have penetrated these systems, it is rare for them to carry out significantly damaging or full-scale attacks.

**Social Media**

Since mid-2013, social media platforms, like Facebook, Twitter, and Orkut, have been popular avenues to organize demonstrations and voice support for a variety of causes, including anti-World Cup sentiments. Facebook has allowed users to spread information about upcoming demonstrations,
peaceful and otherwise, and to publicize slogans, photos, and video from past protest activity. Twitter has allowed coordination and dissemination of information between protestors, hackers, and anti-government groups.

The majority of protests organized on social media are peaceful and nonviolent, and most advertisements on Facebook explicitly call for nonviolence. However, evidence on social media suggests that Anonymous and Black Bloc are monitoring social media content and may be using protest gatherings as cover for anti-government vandalism and violence.

The Brazilian government has monitored protest activity on social media since the 2013 Confederations Cup. However, protestors continue to advertise upcoming demonstrations on Facebook, and anti-government groups continue to act. As the World Cup approaches, increased social media activity regarding anti-World Cup demonstrations, labor union strikes, or other issue-based activist gatherings is likely to increase. While Twitter and Facebook are likely to be the two primary social media platforms used, some groups may turn to cross-platform services, such as WhatsApp, that are more difficult to monitor.

Many OSAC constituents have implemented social media monitoring and tactical intelligence gathering capabilities in order to improve operational decision making during the tournament. By monitoring the scale and location of demonstrations, OSAC constituents will be more capable of avoiding travel delays and disruptions and any collateral damage resulting from violent protest activity. In formulating a social media plan for the World Cup, there many different key terms and users to follow on Brazilian social media channels, and more than one platform to which monitors must pay attention. For a comprehensive overview of open-source, free social media monitoring tools, please see the OSAC report, *Utilizing Social Media during Major Events*.

**Host Nation Security Planning**

Brazil has experience hosting large international events but the size and scope of the FWC will surpass all previous security efforts. The FWC will require unprecedented security operations and collaboration between Brazilian military, federal, state, and local authorities. Brazil has spent about US$900 million on public security in preparation for the FWC, including plans for 150,000 police officers and military personnel to secure FWC host cities and infrastructure. The number of security personnel is three times more than the 50,000 officers deployed during the FCC, and 22 percent more than the previous World Cup in South Africa. Additionally, 20,000 private security staff will be trained to work at FWC venues and inside stadiums. Brazil plans to have one police officer for every 50 people attending the soccer matches, and one for every 80 people at public viewing events around the country. Security officers from a highly trained 10,000 person riot control force will be pre-positioned in each host city in order to respond to a breakdown in civil order.

President Rousseff created the Special Secretariat for Security for Major Events (SESGE) in April 2011 to coordinate security efforts and build capacity leading up to and during major events. SESGE, which falls under the Ministry of Justice, will exist only until completion of events in 2016. The body is responsible

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for operational and strategic security planning at all FWC host cities, in coordination with state and local security forces.

SESGE plans to bring together relevant security, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency services by operating Integrated Command and Control Centers (CICC) in the municipalities that will host World Cup events. These centers will feed into the national center in Brasilia (Rio de Janeiro is the backup center) to facilitate the exchange of information nationwide. Representatives of city agencies, the armed forces, and city, state, and federal police will have a seat in these centers. An anti-terrorism center will check information from foreign databases from around the world and in real time. Critical disruptions to FWC events, such as terrorist attacks, protests, and even robberies, will be monitored from the command centers. In addition, 28 Mobile CICCs, equipped with communications systems, cameras, and computers will be deployed around the country.

SESGE will be coordinating with a number of federal, state, and local entities to carry out security for the tournament. The following are the primary entities performing a safety or security role:

**Armed Forces**
Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MOD) support to the FWC will complement public security and will focus on three areas in particular: the protection of strategic facilities, contingency and prevention plans, and anti-terrorism measures.

**Federal Police**
The Brazilian Federal Police force is small, and most of the manpower is at the state level. The Federal Police have responsibility for border security, immigration, federal and transnational crimes, and terrorism.

**Federal Highway Police**
Federal Highway Police are responsible for combating crime on Brazil’s federal roads and highways. The Highway Police will continue regular duties and facilitate special operations and VIP escort on federal roadways.

**Intelligence Agency (ABIN)**
Brazil’s intelligence agency will focus on intelligence and risk analysis. They will work with international partners on information exchange and counterterrorism efforts.

**Military Police**
Brazil’s Military Police are part of the State public security forces and are responsible for maintaining public order. Military Police are expected to increase patrols around key tourist areas, official events, and hotels during the FWC. The Military Police will play a limited role in supporting crowd control measures in stadiums, a task predominantly carried out by private security organized by the FIFA local organizing committee (LOC).

**National Public Security Force**
This joint force is composed of qualified State Military Police personnel and can be used when a state governor requests reinforcement for a particular security incident or crisis.

**Civil Police**
The Civil Police are the investigative arm of the state public security forces. Officers carry out detective work, forensics, and criminal investigation on state cases.

**Special Police Station for Support to Tourism (DEAT)**
DEAT is a specialized unit within the state civil police that focuses on investigating crimes against visitors. They work in conjunction with the uniformed “tourist police” in popular tourist destinations, but these uniformed officers are part of the state Military Police and separate from the investigative component of DEAT.

**Counter-terrorism Capabilities**
Brazil has three law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, ranging from the investigation of terrorism to interdiction and response. They are the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF), through its Antiterrorism Division (DAT) and Tactical Operations Command (COT); the state-level Military Police Departments, through their respective Police Special Operations Battalions (BOPE); and the state-level Civil Police Departments through their respective Divisions of Special Operations (DOE).

The Brazilian government has also invited security forces from countries taking part in the FWC to be involved in an International Police Cooperation Center (CCPI) in Brasilia. The security representatives, to be called “liaison officers,” will work at the CCPI and will follow their country’s matches from the stadium; they will also be situated in municipalities with high concentrations of supporters to assist with any dialogue between public security bodies and fans. These liaison officers will play an auxiliary role, without the power of police and will not carry firearms. The CCPI will serve as the clearinghouse for information related to criminal records, violations and incidents involving foreign fans, document authenticity from foreign nationals entering Brazil, and passenger lists, among other information.

The government will invest approximately US$9 million in equipment, training security forces, and undertaking other defense-related activities. Equipment purchased for nationwide use includes boats, portable X-ray machines, bomb-detection robots, protective clothing, explosive detection kits, and non-lethal weapons such as smoke grenades, tear gas, rubber bullets, and sound grenades.

**Infrastructure**
Estimates suggest that Brazil will see as many as 600,000 to one million foreign visitors and three million Brazilian tourists transiting to and within Brazil for the FWC. The high number of travelers will pose enormous logistical challenges. Improving transportation and infrastructure prior to the World Cup was at the center of the government’s bid to host the World Cup. However, many large transportation projects -- additional bus lanes, tram, and underground lines -- remain unfinished or scaled back, leaving a capacity gap in many cities’ abilities to handle the projected demands of travelers. To offset anticipated congestion, numerous host cities have declared public holidays on game days.
Roadways/Road Safety

Road conditions vary greatly especially outside of the main cities where navigating rural and interstate roadways can be difficult. Many highways are poorly maintained. Intercity roads are often in relatively better condition but are often congested. Driving standards are poor, and many traffic regulations are disregarded. Accordingly, Brazil has a high level of vehicle accidents and accident-related fatalities. Due to these traffic and road conditions, travelers should consider refraining from self-driving and consider hiring a driver who is familiar with the local environment and security landscape, taking taxis, or utilizing public transportation.

For those who decide to self-drive, driving takes place on the right-hand side, and foreigners may drive using their national driving license for up to 180 days. Traffic law enforcement varies from region to region, and the speed limit on major highways is 74 miles per hour (120 kmh). Apart from toll roads, which generally have their own services, roadside assistance is available only sporadically and informally through local private mechanics. The fastest way to summon assistance in an emergency is to dial 193, a universal number staffed by local fire departments. This service is in Portuguese only. If involved in an accident in which casualties occur, individuals should remain at the scene until the police arrive. However, if only damage to the vehicle occurs, drivers should go to a nearby police station for insurance purposes.

Airports

Flying will be the primary means of transport between host cities. Yet, reports show that improvements are incomplete in 11 major airports that will be used by travelers during the FWC; the airports in Natal and Recife are the only hubs considered fully ready for match day. In Fortaleza, the new terminal is only partly finished, and construction has now been broken into two phases, with the latter phase set to finish after the 2016 Rio Olympics. The airports in Salvador and Cuiaba have experienced delays, and the new terminal at the international airport in Sao Paulo also awaits completion.

Aside from airport construction delays, many airports are overcrowded and procedures – from check-in to boarding – can be slow and inefficient. With the added influx of hundreds of thousands of visitors for the FWC, travelers should be prepared for considerable delays, especially on match days. OSAC constituents should also plan for heavy traffic and arrive at airports well ahead of their anticipated departure time (at least 2-3 hours) and brace for long check-in lines and crowded boarding areas.

Finally, while security at airports is generally adequate, travelers should be mindful that petty crime is more prevalent at establishments that serve tourists, such as airports, and should remain alert to the risk of theft and robbery at airport terminals. OSAC constituents should ignore approaches by people offering services, from changing money to carrying luggage.

Stadiums

All FCC stadiums were scheduled to be completed by the end of 2013, but only six were completed on time. Deadlines have been routinely delayed; three stadiums remain unfinished: the Arena Corinthians in Sao Paulo, the Arena da Baixada in Curitiba, and the Arena Pantanal in Cuiaba. Despite setbacks,
missed deadlines, and budget overages, FWC organizers express little doubt that the stadiums will be ready in time.

**Telecommunications**

Investments in telecommunication infrastructure have not kept pace with the growth in mobile phone usage in Brazil, often resulting in spotty coverage and poor service. However, there are also important regional variations. Telecommunication networks in the center and south are extensive and modern, whereas those in the north and northeast often lack basic landline connections.

OSAC constituents can expect Internet access to be widely available in major cities. Some phone companies are expanding their Wi-Fi networks at hotels and other public venues to help offload heavy data users from cell phone networks. The concentration of data-heavy users will put an unprecedented strain on local networks that are already struggling to meet demand. In order to ameliorate this problem, the telecom industry promised to install additional networks to reinforce coverage in all FWC stadiums. However, this promise is unlikely to be realized. Brazil’s Communications Minister Paulo Bernando stated that six of the 12 stadiums have not yet inked deals to install Wi-Fi networks, leaving only mobile networks available, which are not likely to be sufficient to supply fans’ demands for sending text messages, calling friends, and uploading pictures and video to social media during the games.

OSAC constituents should be aware that communication with employees while at games might be difficult due to cell phone network capacity and coverage. Constituents are encouraged to arrange back-up/alternative means of communication with employees especially in the event of an emergency. Establishing rallying points and multiple methods of communication are prudent security measures to consider.

**Health and Medical**

The quality and availability of medical care varies widely and may not meet U.S. standards outside of major cities. In rural areas of 50,000 people or less, representing 90 percent of the country’s municipalities, Brazil faces a severe shortage of doctors. In response, President Rousseff launched the “Mais Medicos,” or ‘More Doctors,’ program to import 13,000, mostly Cuban, doctors by May of 2014. The hiring of foreign doctors and the amount of public money being spent on the FWC, in contrast to public health spending, has been a point of contention for many Brazilians.

Within major cities, prescription and over-the-counter medications are widely available. Emergency services are responsive, and travelers may call a private ambulance company or dial 192 for ambulance transport to a public hospital. Callers must stay on the line to provide their location, as there is no automatic tracking of phone calls. Foreign nationals are entitled to emergency medical treatment in Brazilian public hospitals. Public hospitals, especially in major cities, tend to be crowded.

The majority of Brazilian physicians and hospitals expect payment in cash at the time services are rendered. Without proof of insurance, deposit, or adequate financial guarantee, medical professionals

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may withhold even emergency care at private or public hospitals. It is advisable that travelers carry with them proof of health and medical evacuation insurance.

All travelers to Brazil should have prior vaccinations for Hepatitis A and Typhoid. Routine immunizations include: yearly flu shots, MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella), TDaP (tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis), Varicella (chickenpox), and polio. Based on the city and the duration of stay, Hepatitis B, malaria, rabies, and Yellow Fever, may also be needed in the form of medication or pre-vaccination. (Please see the city overviews at the end of this report for CDC recommendations and available medical facilities for specific host cities.)

**OSAC World Cup Coverage**

OSAC will have six analysts in Brazil to support the U.S. private sector during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. OSAC analysts will be based in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia and will be available for in-person, phone, and email consultations during the tournament. OSAC will produce a daily report highlighting relevant security, protest, and logistical information. If you would like to be included on OSAC’s distribution list to receive updates related to the World Cup, please send a request with your name, title, organization, and contact details to OSACMajorEvents@state.gov.

The U.S. State Department recommends that all travelers enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) prior to traveling overseas. Additional information regarding tips for World Cup travelers is contained in the State Department World Cup Fact Sheet.

**U.S.G. Contact Information**

**U.S. Embassy Brasilia**
Address: Av. Das Nacoes Sul, Quadra 801, Lote 3
Telephone: 55 (61) 3312-7000
Regional Security Officer (RSO): 55 (61) 3312-7390
American Citizen Services (ACS): 55 (61) 3312-7063/7471
OSAC: TBA

**U.S. Consulate General Rio de Janeiro**
Address: Av. Presidente Wilson, 147 Bairro Castelo
ACS: 55 (21) 3823-2000
After Hours ACS: 55 (21) 3823-2029
OSAC: TBA

**U.S. Consulate General Sao Paulo**
Address: Rua Henri Dunant, 500, Chacara Santo Antonio
Telephone: 55 (11) 3250-5000

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RSO: 55 (11) 3250-5260
ACS: 55 (11) 3250-5373
Emergency After Hours: 55 (11) 5186-7000

U.S. Consulate General Recife
Address: Rua Goncalves Maia 163, Bairro Boa Vista
Telephone: 55 (81)3416-2050
RSO: 55 (81) 3416-3114
ACS: 55 (81) 3416-3080
After Hours ACS: 55 (81) 9916-9470

U.S. Consular Agent – Belem
Address: Avenida Conselheiro Furtado 2865, Edificio Sintese 21, Rooms 1104/1106
Telephone: 55 (91) 3259-4566
The U.S. Consular Agency in Belém is open to the public Monday thru Friday, from 3:00pm-6:00pm, except for U.S. and Brazilian holidays.

U.S. Consular Agent – Manaus
Address: Edificio Atrium Sala 306, Rua Franco de Sá, 310
The U.S. Consular Agency in Manaus is open to the public Monday thru Friday, from 9:00am-12:00pm, except for U.S. and Brazilian holidays.

U.S. Consular Agent – Fortaleza
Address: Torre Santos Dumont, Av. Santos Dumont 2828, # 708
Telephone: (85) 3021-5200 /From US: 011-55-85-3021-5200
The U.S. Consular Agency in Fortaleza is open to the public Monday thru Friday, from 8:00am-12:00pm, except for U.S. and Brazilian holidays.

U.S. Consular Agent – Porto Alegre
Address: Rua Riachelo, 1257, r. 210, 90010-271 - Porto Alegre, RS
Telephone: (51) 3226-3344 / From U.S.: 011-55-51-3226-3366

U.S. Consular Agent – Salvador de Bahia
Address: Salvador Trade Center, room 1401, Torre Sul, Avenida Tancredo Neves, 1632, Caminho das Árvores
Telephone: (71) 3113-2090 or 2091 / From US: 011-55-71-3113-
The Consular Agency in Salvador is open in the mornings only, from 8:30AM to 11:30AM, except on Brazilian and U.S. holidays.
Appendix: 2014 FIFA World Cup Security Host City Overviews

RIO DE JANEIRO

Rio de Janeiro is the second largest city in Brazil and the country’s premier tourist destination. The city of Rio de Janeiro is the capital of Rio de Janeiro state, located in the southern part of the country. The city is commonly divided into four areas – Centro (City Center), Zona Sul (South Zone), Zona Norte (North Zone), and Zona Oeste (West Zone). Tourist-friendly Zona Sul is known for its beaches, high-end hotels, and restaurants. Various embassies and government buildings are also located in this area. Zona Norte contains Maracanã soccer stadium, and Centro is the downtown business district and the dividing line between the north and south zones. The sprawling Zona Oeste makes up about 50 percent of the city area and includes the affluent Barra da Tijuca neighborhood.

Crime: Most violent crime occurs in poor districts in the north and in the more than 1,000 favelas scattered throughout the city. In recent years, security forces have cracked down on Rio de Janeiro’s two major drug gangs – the Commando Vermelho and the Amigos do Amigos – in the Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha favelas. While the homicide rate has been falling over the past decade, street crime remains the greatest threat to personal security in Rio de Janeiro. The U.S. Department of State rates crime in the city as “Critical,” the highest category. According to an analysis of police statistics from the O Globo newspaper, crime rates in Rio jumped significantly in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013; murders were up 23.9 percent; muggings up 46.6 percent; and car theft up 31.3 percent.

Criminality in Rio de Janeiro can be brazen at times, with some criminal gangs executing highly coordinated robberies of apartment residences and hotel guests. Crimes of opportunity, such as mugging, petty theft, carjacking/car theft, residential theft, and credit card fraud (ATM skimming and credit card cloning), will pose the greatest threat to travelers in Rio de Janeiro. Criminals frequently target victims with expensive electronics like cellular phones, laptops, and tablets. Foreigners, especially those who do not speak Portuguese, may be more at risk for being targeted for crime. Criminals are aware that foreigners frequently do not file a police report and will likely not return to testify against them.

Although areas in the South Zone, such as Leblon, Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leme, are considered safer, no area of the city is immune from crime, and travelers should refrain from taking any valuables to the beach. Visitors should be wary of beach areas at sunset and in the early hours of the day when they are less populated. If confronted by an assailant displaying a lethal weapon or threatening violence, turn over all valuables immediately. Do not resist or talk back to the assailant. In some high-profile cases in Rio, individuals, including foreigners, were shot dead for noncompliance. The same goes for carjacking situations. Surrender the vehicle and offer no resistance. For more information on crime in Rio de Janeiro, please see the Rio OSAC Crime and Safety Report.

In early May, the Rio de Janeiro state government introduced a special security scheme for the FWC. Originally set to take effect at the beginning of the tournament, the government decided to deploy an
additional 2,000 Military Police officers a month early to address a rise in crime. Under the new plan, police officers’ vacations will be suspended until the end of the World Cup and can be called back to work on off-days.

In 2008, Rio de Janeiro introduced a favela pacification program to bring favelas under government and police control. The Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (UPPs) inserted community police forces into favelas to reduce crime and increase public safety. Although there has been a decrease in crime levels in Rio following the implementation of UPPs, in many cases criminals have just relocated to other areas.

Rio de Janeiro security forces routinely conduct raids targeting favelas in order to counter drug traffickers and armed gangs. Raids by security forces generally remain restricted to the targeted area; however, occasionally armed confrontations spill over into adjacent neighborhoods and major roadways. In April, violent confrontations between police and protestors occurred in the Pavao-Pavaozinha favela next to the affluent Copacabana and Ipanema neighborhoods, resulting in the closure of two main roads. OSAC constituents should expect these raids to continue, as the authorities seek to improve the security situation in the lead up to the FWC.

Some tour operators offer favela tours by jeep; however, it is recommended to only enter favelas if you have a compelling need. Entering unpacified favelas is dangerous and unwise. The U.S. Consulate General Rio de Janeiro restricts government employees from traveling to any of the unpacified favelas in Rio. OSAC’s 2012 whitepaper report on Rio de Janeiro’s favela pacification program offers a more in-depth analysis on the effectiveness and operational intricacies of the program.

**Civil Unrest:** Political protests in Rio are generally non-violent and held for a variety of causes: work conditions, wages, and the environment. During the 2013 FCC June protests, significant numbers of demonstrators took to the streets. While many of these protests were marred by violence and clashes with police, who resorted to the use of tear gas and rubber bullets, the impact to OSAC constituents was largely logistical.

Since the FCC, protests in Rio have continued but decreased in size and frequency. While the protests have not been directed at U.S. citizens, there have been incidents of vandalism that have affected U.S. government facilities, storefronts, and ATMs. During the FWC, constituents’ facilities could be vandalized if located along protest routes and could be soft targets of anarchist groups. Travelers should avoid all areas where large crowds are gathering or where protests are on-going.

In addition to protests, there are also concerns over possible mass strikes and labor unrest. In April, 200 federal police agents staged a protest in Copacabana, threatening a work stoppage during the World Cup unless demands for higher wages, better working conditions, and a restructuring of career paths were met. Similarly, in March, garbage collectors in Rio went on strike to demand higher wages from the government. As a result, trash piled up in the streets until the two sides worked out an agreement. Strikes are often announced with a few days’ notice; monitor local media for any union negotiations stalemating and make contingency plans.
Transportation: Street lighting, traffic signals, and road markings vary from good to poor throughout the city. The metro system is clean, efficient, and generally safe, but there have been reports of theft and pickpocketing. Metro line 1 consists of 19 stations and runs from Ipanema; line 2 covers 16 stations and begins at Estacio. The small vans found throughout the city should be completely avoided; many are operated by organized crime. Marked taxis are generally safe and abundant. Ensure that the taxi has a functional meter after you enter the vehicle and never negotiate a price. Never enter an unofficial taxi or share a taxi.

Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport (GIG), commonly known as Galeao, is nine miles (15km) northeast of the city center. Journey times from the airport to the city center vary between 30 and 60 minutes depending on traffic. Visitors should use cooperativos (radio taxis) from the airport and avoid unofficial taxis. Rio’s second airport, Santos Dumont Airport (SDU), is conveniently located in the heart of the city, roughly four miles (6km) east of the city center, and handles most domestic flights. Journey times to Zona Sul can be fairly quick, barring traffic. In general, visitors in Rio should allow for plenty of time between locations due to chronic traffic congestion.

Stadium: Estádio Jornalista Mário Filho (Maracanã)

Capacity: 76,804

Address: Rua Professor Eurico Rabelo, Maracanã, Rio de Janeiro 20271-150

Colloquially known as Maracanã, Estádio Jornalista Mário Filho was built for the 1950 FIFA World Cup and is the largest stadium in the country. The stadium was officially renamed in 1966 following the death of Brazilian journalist Mário Filho, but most people continue referring to the stadium as Maracanã. Construction upgrades to the stadium in preparation for this World Cup are complete and included the expansion of access ramps, the replacement of all seating, a new roof, and seating adjustments to allow for improved visibility. The stadium will host seven games, more than any other venue, including the FWC final on July 13.

Maracanã is located in Rio’s Zona Nord, about three miles (5km) from downtown Rio and 7.5 miles (12 km) north of Copacabana and Ipanema beach. The stadium is accessible by metro, train, bus, or taxi. There are also several bus routes with a stadium stop, and both the metro and train stops are conveniently named “Maracanã.”

Estádio Jornalista Mário Filho (Maracanã) - Match Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/06 19:00</td>
<td>Argentina vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/06 16:00</td>
<td>Spain vs. Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/06 13:00</td>
<td>Belgium vs. Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/06 17:00</td>
<td>Ecuador vs. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/06 17:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04/07 13:00</td>
<td>Quarter Final</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Fan Fest

Rio’s Fan Fest will be on Copacabana beach.

Hospitals

The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name</th>
<th>Hospital Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Samaritano (Private)</td>
<td>Rua Bambina 98, Botafogo, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2537-9722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clínica São Vicente (Private)</td>
<td>Rua João Borges 204, Gávea, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2529-4422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Pró-Cardíaco (Private)</td>
<td>Rua Dona Mariana 219, Botafogo, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2537-4242/2527-6060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro Pediatrico da Lagoa (Public)</td>
<td>Rua Jardim Botanico 448, Jardim Botanico, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2535-7932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Copa d’Or (Public)</td>
<td>Rua Figueiredo de Magalhães 875, Copacabana, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2545-3600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Miguel Couto (Public)</td>
<td>Rua Mário Ribeiro 117, Gávea, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2274-6050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Souza Aguiar (Public)</td>
<td>Praça da República 111, Centro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2296-4114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Lourenço Jorge (Public)</td>
<td>Avenida Ayrton Senna 2000, Barra da Tijuca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Phone: (21) 2431-1244/2431-1818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24-hour Pharmacies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pharmacy Contact Information</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmacia do Leme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Prado Junior, 237, Copacabana, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone: (21) 2275-3847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmacia Cristal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Marques de Abrantes, 27, Flamengo, Zona Sul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone: (21) 2265-3444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emergency Numbers – Rio de Janeiro

Fire Department: 193
Ambulance: 192
Military Police: 190
Civil Police: 197
Federal Police: 194

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Policia Militar (Military Police) Precinct Ipanema: (21) 2332-2074
Policia Militar (Military Police) Precinct Lagoa: (21) 2332-2912
Policia Militar (Military Police) Precinct Copacabana: (21) 2332-7913/14
Policia Militar (Military Police) Precinct Flamengo: (21) 2334-3972 / 4126
Policia Militar (Military Police) Precinct Leblon: (21) 2332-2877 / 2866
Policia Civil (Civil Police): (21) 3399-7170
Policia Civil (Civil Police) – Tourist (DEAT): (21) 2332-2924
SAO PAULO

Sao Paulo is Brazil’s largest city and commercial hub. The sheer size and density of the Sao Paulo metropolitan area contributes to significant logistical and criminal concerns for residents and travelers alike. During the 2013 FCC, a student protest movement against bus-fare hikes that began in Sao Paulo was influential in sparking nationwide anti-government protests. Although no FCC games were played in Sao Paulo, civil unrest significantly impacted commuters and businesses in popular protest areas.

Crime: Crime is ubiquitous in Sao Paulo; therefore, all neighborhoods are susceptible to opportunistic crime. There are daily reports of armed robberies, which occur regularly in the affluent residential sections of Jardins, Morumbi, Campo Belo, and Moema where a number of government and business leaders and a majority of the U.S. Consulate employees reside. Opportunistic crimes—such as pickpocketing, armed mugging, carjacking, and express kidnappings—driven by the appearance of wealth will pose security risks to visitors. ATM/credit card fraud is also a key security risk. The U.S. Consulate General in Sao Paulo also recommends avoiding all adult nightclubs.

In-transit crimes, like carjacking and armed robberies from vehicles, are common because of heavy traffic congestion. Drivers and passengers waiting in traffic and at stop-lights are easy soft targets for petty criminals. Robbers are often armed and are willing to use violence; therefore, it is important to comply with their demands. Reports of crimes against travelers along the road to Sao Paulo’s international airport frequently occur, as criminals look to identify potential targets of wealth and affluence as they arrive and depart. Laptop computers are the number one target. Travelers should seek to use alternative and more concealable technology, such as thumb drives or CD/DVD ROMs. If laptops are brought to São Paulo, they should be stored discretely in luggage and/or placed in the trunk of a vehicle.

Mass robberies of restaurant or hotel patrons represent a specialized type of crime called a restaurant or hotel “invasion.” Criminals are usually armed, working in a group, and target multiple victims in a specific area. Restaurant invasions have presented significant security challenges to restaurant owners over the past three years. More often than not, criminals target more expensive restaurants in wealthy neighborhoods based on a perception that the pay-off is likely to be higher. These criminals demand cash, credit cards, and valuables. Some restaurant owners employ guards as a precaution against restaurant invasions. In 2013, 30 restaurant guests were robbed during a single restaurant invasion in the upper-class Sao Paulo neighborhood of Moema. None were injured.

In early October 2013, imprisoned gang leaders from the First Capital Command (PCC) issued a general threat to the FWC in wiretapped telephone conversations, according to Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper. Members of the gang promised a “tournament of terror” if the government moved forward with relocating gang leaders to a higher security prison. The PCC also threatened to conduct prison riots, attack police, and commit unspecified acts of public violence in retaliation for prisoner transfers. The PCC has demonstrated a capability to instigate long-term outbreaks of violence in the Sao Paulo region, most recently in the second half of 2012. The PCC almost exclusively conducted targeted attacks against Sao Paulo Military Police officers, but PCC vandals burned some public buses and storefronts. Over 100 police officers were killed during PCC-coordinated violence in 2012. The “tournament of terror” threat is unlikely to come to fruition. For more information on crime in Sao Paulo, please see the 2014 OSAC Sao Paulo Crime and Safety Report.
Civil Unrest: On June 20, 2013, anti-government demonstrations in Sao Paulo during the FCC peaked when approximately 100,000 protestors marched on Avenida Paulista. Protest organizers utilized the large, open space at Praça de Se (Se Plaza) in the heart of the city to rally protestors before embarking on marches downtown. The route on Avenida Paulista from Rua da Consolação to Avenida Bernardino de Campos has become one of the most popular protest routes in Sao Paulo. Several well-known hotels, metro stations, and landmarks like the Museu de Arte are located on Avenida Paulista. Banks and ATMs along protest routes were popular targets. Through the duration of the FCC tournament, multiple, simultaneous protests often started in the early afternoon and sometimes extended past midnight. On two separate occasions, protestors blocked traffic on Rodovia Hélio Smidt, the main road leading to Sao Paulo Guarulhos International Airport. Police response to the airport protests was quick and sufficient, and protestors were not able to breach security lines. An OSAC constituent reported that authorities prevented passengers from entering or leaving the airport. Takeoffs and landings were not impacted by the disruption, although some passengers missed their flights.

Since the conclusion of the FCC on July 1, 2013, anti-government demonstrations have been intermittent, relatively smaller in size, but occasionally violent. In January and February, two separate peaceful demonstrations spiraled into violence after splinter groups of protestors started smashing windows, burning vehicles, and vandalizing storefronts and ATMs. Some claim that Black Bloc anarchists, who wear black clothing and cover their faces with masks, sparked the violent outbursts and instigated riot police. Since then, the size and frequency of protests has diminished. However, a small number of violent demonstrations in the months leading up to the 2014 FWC have renewed concerns about transportation setbacks and collateral violence. A large contingent of student activists and others motivated by the success of last year’s surge in anti-government and anti-World Cup demonstrations are likely to take advantage of the global attention to the six FWC matches, including high-profile opening and semi-final matches. Final destinations often included local government buildings such as and Teatro São Pedro. Riot police frequently used tear gas and rubber bullets to contain unruly protestors.

Vehicles and buses in Sao Paulo provide ample targets for radical protestors, arsonists, and vengeful criminals. Violent protestors and criminal gangs frequently burn public buses. Most bus burnings occur after a public demonstration ends in violence, but some are in retaliation for police shooting deaths, and others serve as displays of criminal groups’ strength. The PCC’s stronghold in Sao Paulo was the setting for two prolonged waves of police attacks and bus burnings in 2006 and 2012. There is no evidence to suggest that the intent behind bus burnings is to kill innocent people. Rather, the act is used as a display of power in revolt against the government or as an act of intimidation against bus owners by organized crime.

Various demonstrations against the FWC and the Brazilian government are likely to continue throughout the FWC, especially in Sao Paulo, given that some of the largest demonstrations during the FCC exceeded the size and scope of protests in other parts of the country. Furthermore, anti-FWC and anti-government activism remains strong in Sao Paulo, as evidenced by a continued protest since the conclusion of the 2013 FCC. Demonstrations in Sao Paulo could impact movements to and from Arena de Sao Paulo on match days, particularly on major thoroughfares going from the center of the city toward the stadium.
Transportation: Visitors have several public transit options. The subway train system, Metro, is a quick and inexpensive option for sightseeing and travel to Arena de Sao Paulo. The Corinthians-Itaquera Metro and bus stations are closest to Arena de Sao Paulo, and if construction work is completed in time for the Opening Match on June 12, Metro lines 3 and 11 will transport spectators approximately 15 miles (25 kilometers) from the city center to the stadium. Overcrowding on Metro trains can lead to a permissive environment for pickpockets.

Public buses are generally unsafe. A lack of security on buses permits armed robbers to board and steal cash and valuables. The manner in which most bus drivers operate their vehicles is erratic and can lead to serious traffic accidents.

Taxis are plentiful and offer a direct route to destinations. However, the U.S. Consulate General in Sao Paulo highly discourages hailing taxis off the street because some are illegal. Patronizing an illegal taxi can put riders at risk for armed robbery or express kidnapping. Instead, most hotels, restaurants, and businesses will have contact information for taxi services and can call a safe taxi. Taxis at the airport are considered safe and are part of a cooperative that allows them to operate at the airport. If possible, before entering a taxi, obtain the name of the taxi service and the license plate number. Legal registered taxis are identified as:

- White cars
- Taxi decal (bubble on top of roof)
- Red license plate tags (identify mass transportation vehicles)
- Cooperative sign on left and right sides of car

Stadium: Arena de Sao Paulo

Capacity: 65,807

The Arena de Sao Paulo will host four group stage matches and two playoff matches, including the opening match of the tournament between Brazil and Croatia and a semi-final match. The stadium is located approximately 11 miles (18 kilometers) from Guarulhos-Sao Paulo International Airport and 12 miles (20 kilometers) from Congonhas-Sao Paulo Airport.

Arena de Sao Paulo - Match Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/06</td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Brazil vs. Croatia (Opening Match)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/06</td>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Uruguay vs. England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06</td>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Netherlands vs. Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06</td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Korea Republic vs. Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/07</td>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09/07</td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Semi-final</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name/Address</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HC Hospital das Clínicas At: Av. Dr. Enéas de Carvalho Aguiar 255</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 2661 0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Alemão Oswaldo Cruz At: Rua João Julião 331, Paraíso</td>
<td>Tel: (11)3549 0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Einstein Hospital At: Av. Albert Einstein 627/701, Morumbi</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 2151 1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Luiz Hospital At: Eng. Oscar Americano St. 840, Morumbi</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3093 1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Cruz At: Rua Santa Cruz 398, Vila Mariana</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 5080 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Samaritano At: Rua Conselheiro Brotero 1486, Higienopolis</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3821 5300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Bandeirantes At: Rua Galvão Bueno 257, Liberdade</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3345 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficência Portuguesa At: Rua Maestro Cardim 769, Paraiso</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3505 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sírio Libanês At: Rua Adma Jafet 91, Bela Vista</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3155 0200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Catarina At: Av Paulista 200, Bela Vista 1</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3016 4133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital São Paulo At: Rua Napoleão de Barros 737</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 5576 4036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Aviccena At: Rua Pe Adelino 901, Vila Verde</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 2602 0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronto Socorro Infantil Sabará (Sabará Children’s Emergency Clinic) At: Rua Dona Antonio de Queiros 505, Consolação</td>
<td>Tel: (11) 3155 2800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

São Paulo Emergency Services – Phone Numbers
Ambulance/Medical Emergency - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department - 193
Tourist Police Station - (11) 3107 5642/3107 8332
BRASILIA

Brasilia replaced Rio de Janeiro as the capital city in 1960 and was designed and built to serve as the country's political and administrative center. Some of the city's most prominent features are its wide avenues built primarily for automobile traffic and spacious grounds that house the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government.

Crime: Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns, such as robbery, burglary, assault, and theft, as other FWC host cities. Street crime is a primary concern, particularly at night, and police report that crime is becoming more widespread. However, violent crimes, such as kidnapping, armed assault, murder, and carjacking, also occur regularly. Criminals are usually armed and have used violence against victims who resist. Public transportation hubs, hotel sectors, and tourist areas have the highest crime rates. Organized crime exists on a smaller scale than other cities. The consolidation of power among a few large criminal gangs resulted in an increased focus on civilian targets. Residential burglaries pose a constant threat and concern. According to the police, much of this crime is carried out by mobile street gangs, originating from larger, distant cities. For more information on crime in Brasilia please see the OSAC Crime & Safety Report.

Civil Unrest: During the FCC, Brasilia saw a fair amount of activity (most of it peaceful), including at the Estadio Nacional (site of the opening match) and Eixo Monumental. While a demonstration against government spending on the tournament was peaceful, a march on the Foreign Ministry building was not. There, protesters started a fire and attacked other government buildings. The Museu Nacional, the Governor’s mansion, and Plano Piloto Road were also sites of popular demonstrations during the FCC. During the latter protest, demonstrators clashed with police, used buses as blockades, set fire to two buses, and damaged 15 more.

In February 2014, 15,000 protestors from the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, or MST) clashed with police over anti-capitalism issues as they tried to enter Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court and Planalto Palace, which is President Dilma Rousseff’s residence. At least 12 protestors and 30 police officers were injured in the confrontation.

Transportation: Brasilia was designed under the assumption that every resident would own an automobile, so the layout of the city is not pedestrian-friendly. It is, therefore, important for visitors to have an understanding of public transportation.

Most local buses start from or go through the center of the city and run along the “wings,” which serve the residential zones - or through the Eixo Monumental. Red-and-white minibuses, called Zebrinhaare, link the central area to Esplanada dos Ministérios, the airport, and some of the main avenues. Buses must be flagged; otherwise they will only stop when a passenger requests to disembark.

Taxis cannot be hailed on the streets. Taxi stands are close to all tourist attractions, and hotels can call a cab or provide the phone number of dispatch offices.

The subway system’s Y-shaped line starts in the center of the city and travels southward. It does not go to most political and tourist spots of Brasilia.

Stadium: Estadio Nacional de Brasilia
Capacity: 68,009

The Estadio Nacional will host four group matches, a round of 16 match, the quarterfinals, and the play-off for third place at the FWC. The stadium will be the second largest to host FWC matches. Estádio Nacional is located within walking distance of many of the city’s tourist destinations and toward the western end of the Eixo Monumental, between the TV Tower and the JK Memorial. The stadium lies just over a mile (1.5 km) from metro station Central. Take a bus that runs along the Eixo Monumental to get from Central to the stadium.

**Estadio Nacional de Brasilia - Match Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/06 13:00</td>
<td>Ecuador vs. Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/06 13:00</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire vs. Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06 17:00</td>
<td>Brazil vs. Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06 13:00</td>
<td>Portugal vs. Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/06 13:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/07 13:00</td>
<td>Quarter-Finals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/07 1700</td>
<td>Play-off for Third Place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hospitals**

*The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name/Address</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Lucia</td>
<td>Tel: 55 61 3445 0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: W3 Sul 716, Conjunto C Asa Sul Section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Brasilia</td>
<td>Tel: 55 61 3248 9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Shis QI 15, TR. 5, Lote G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital de Base (Trauma Care)</td>
<td>Tel: 55 61 3325-4080/5050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: SMHS 101, Bloco A, in the Asa Sul Section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brasilia Emergency Services – Phone Numbers**

- Public Ambulance - 192
- Police - 190
- Fire Department – 193
- For private ground-ambulance service -- Vida Ambulance (61) 3248-3030

**Particular Medical Concerns**
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that all travelers over the age of nine months visiting the Distrito Federal, which includes Brasilia, obtain a Yellow Fever vaccination. Please reference the 2012 CDC Yellow Fever Vaccination Map for Brazil for more information.
BELO HORIZONTE

Belo Horizonte is the sixth-most populous city in Brazil with just over 2.4 million residents and located in the state Minas Gerais, in the south-central region of the country.

Crime: Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns, such as robbery, assault, burglary, and theft, as in other FWC host cities. Street crime is a primary concern, particularly at night. Criminals are usually armed and have used violence against victims who resist. While in public, refrain from wearing expensive (or expensive looking) jewelry and anything that contains gold, silver, or precious stones. ATM and credit card fraud is common, so keep sight of your credit/debit cards at all times.

Civil Unrest: Demonstrations are generally non-aggressive, but the potential for violence exists. During the FCC, police clashed with protestors who approached the stadium during a Brazil v. Uruguay match. Nearly 50,000 protestors gathered at Praca Sete and marched to the Estadio Mineirao. Police used tear gas to push demonstrators back from the stadium, and a small group of protestors attempted to break through the police cordon. Groups of demonstrators vandalized shops, set fire to cars, and threw rocks and fireworks at police.

Stadium: Estadio Mineirao

Capacity: 62,254

This historic stadium has undergone a complete overhaul and will host six FWC matches, including one semi-final match. The stadium hosted its first match in 1965.

Belo Horizonte - Estadio Mineirao Match Schedule 2014 World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/14 13:00</td>
<td>Colombia vs. Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17 13:00</td>
<td>Belgium vs. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/21 13:00</td>
<td>Argentina vs. Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/24 13:00</td>
<td>Costa Rica vs. England</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation: Estadio Mineirão is located in the north of the city about six miles (9 km) from the downtown area. Tancredo Neves/Confins International Airport, newly expanded for the FWC, is located about 25 miles (40 km) from the city center.

Public buses are prone to safety and security problems. Buses are normally in poor condition, and operators, in general, do not take the safety of their passengers into consideration. Buses are vulnerable to armed attacks especially during the hours of darkness.

Taxis are generally a safer form of public transportation. In general, using a legitimate taxi, such as those found at major hotels, has been safe. Let the hotel call the cab if possible. If you hail a cab from the...
street, make sure that you note the license plate and the number of the cab. Know your destination and do not get into a taxi if there is anyone else but the driver inside.

More information about transportation options can be found under the “Getting Around” tab at: http://www.belohorizonte.mg.gov.br/visit/en.

Hospitals

The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.

Hospital Felicio Rocho (Fundção Felice Rosso)
Av. do Contorno, 9530
Barro Preto, Belo Horizonte
30110-934
Tel: 55 (31) 3514 7000

Hospital Madre Teresa
Av. Raja Gabaglia, 1002 - Gutierrez
Belo Horizonte
30441-070
Tel: 55 (31) 3339 8000

Hospital Joao XXIII
Av Professor Alfredo Balena, 400
Santa Efigênia, Belo Horizonte
Tel: 31-3239-9200

Belo Horizonte Emergency Services – Phone Numbers
Public Ambulance - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department - 193

Particular Medical Concerns

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that all travelers over the age of nine months visiting the state of Minas Gerais, which includes Belo Horizonte, obtain a Yellow Fever vaccination. For specific vaccination and health guidance, please visit the CDC.
FORTALEZA

With a population of over 2.4 million, the coastal city of Fortaleza is the state capital of Ceará in northeastern Brazil and a popular tourist destination. The state of Ceará is best known for its beaches, including Jericoacoara and Canoa Quebrada.

Crime: Fortaleza has the highest murder rate of any Brazilian city. Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns, such as opportunistic street crime, carjacking, robbery, and assault, as in other FWC host cities. Criminals are usually armed and have used violence against victims who resist. ATM and credit card fraud is common, so keep sight of your credit/debit cards at all times.

Civil Unrest: During the FCC, Fortaleza was among several host cities riddled by protests. Angered by alleged corruption and misplaced spending, protestors battled with police on numerous occasions outside the Estadio Castelão and blocked the main access road in advance of the FCC semi-final match between Mexico and Brazil.

Stadium: Estadio Castelão

Capacity: 58,704

Fortaleza was the first host city to complete refurbishment of its stadium prior to the FCC and FWC. In the lead up to the FCC, worker strikes threatened the undertaking, but a pay raise agreement was reached. The stadium was built to be a multi-purpose venue. Arena Castelão is located in the south of the city, six miles (10 km) from the Dragão do Mar area and Iracema Beach and a similar distance from Fortaleza’s eastern beaches.

Estadio Castelão – Match Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date-Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/14 16:00</td>
<td>Uruguay vs. Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17 15:00</td>
<td>Brazil vs. Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/21 16:00</td>
<td>Germany vs. Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/24 17:00</td>
<td>Greece vs. Côte D'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/29 13:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/4 17:00</td>
<td>Quarter Finals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation: The stadium has been upgraded with four exclusive bus lanes, a LRV (light-rail vehicle) line, and two metro stations. There will also be an underground parking garage with 1,900 spaces, though these will not be available to spectators during the FWC. Only credentialed vehicles will be able to access stadium grounds.

From the city center, one can take bus 666 to the stadium. Public buses also depart for Castelão from the seaside promenade at Avenida Beira Mar.
The new metro stops do not pass Castelão directly. Spectators traveling by metro should disembark at Parangaba to take a taxi or a bus the remaining 1.2 miles (1.9 km) to the stadium.

Fortaleza’s airport lies approximately 2.1 miles (3.5 km) north of the stadium and is a reasonable taxi ride away.

**Hospitals**

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Hospital Monte Klinikum  
Rua Republica do Libano, 747  
Meireles, Fortaleza, 60160-140  
Tel: 55 (85) 4012 0012

**Fortaleza Emergency Services – Phone Numbers**

- Public Ambulance - 192  
- Police - 190  
- Fire Department – 193
**SALVADOR**

Salvador is Brazil’s third-most populous city and serves as the state capital of Bahia in northeastern Brazil. Salvador is the economic hub of northeastern Brazil and beach tourism is an important part of the local economy.

**Crime:** Salvador is the third most violent city in Brazil. Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns such as robbery, assault, burglary, and theft, as in other host cities of the FWC. Street crime is a primary concern, particularly at night. Criminals are usually armed and have used violence against victims who resist. ATM and credit card fraud is common, so keep sight of your credit/debit cards at all times.

**Civil Unrest:** During the 2013 FCC, Salvador was one of the five host cities that experienced protests. In April, the city faced a five-day police strike after police failed to reach an agreement with the government in a dispute over higher pay and better working conditions. With a third of the state’s police on strike, 78 murders occurred. The government sent in military troops to end the strike and reinstate order.

**Stadium: Arena Fonte Nova**

Capacity: 52,048

Arena Fonte Nova is a brand-new stadium, built to replace the old Estadio Octavio Mangabeira (also known as Fonte Nova) stadium that was closed in 2007. The old stadium was demolished after part of the terrace collapsed during a soccer match, killing seven spectators. The new stadium will be a part of a multi-use complex that will house a restaurant, soccer museum, stores, hotels, a concert hall, and a parking garage.

**Arena Fonte Nova - Match Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date-Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/13 16:00</td>
<td>Spain vs. Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16 13:00</td>
<td>Germany vs. Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/20 16:00</td>
<td>Switzerland vs. France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/25 13:00</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina vs. Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1 17:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/5 17:00</td>
<td>Quarter Finals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transportation:** There are a number of transportation options, including taxis, buses, and car rentals. Spectators can utilize any form of public transport to Castro Alves Square and walk less than 10 minutes to the stadium.

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Deputado Luis Eduardo Magalhães International Airport is one of Brazil's main airports. Traveling from the airport to Arena Fonte Nova by car takes approximately 30 minutes.

**Hospitals**

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Curativos Serviços de Saúde Ltda.  
Rua Almirante Barroso, 358  
Rio Vermelho  
Salvador  
41950-350  
Tel: 55 (71) 3878 6990

Hospital Evangélico da Bahia  
Avenida D. João VI, 1.291  
Brotas, Salvador  
40240-320  
Tel: 55 (71) 3357 8800

Hospital São Rafael  
Av. São Rafael, 2.152  
São Marcos, Salvador  
41253-190  
Tel: 55 (71) 3281 6000

Hospital da Sagrada Família  
Rua Plínio de Lima, 1  
Monte Serrat, Salvador  
40415-065  
Tel: 55 (71) 3310 9100

Hospital de Olhos Ruy Cunha - DayHORC  
Av. Prof. Magalhães Neto, 1.451  
Centro Médico  
9º andar Bloco A - Pituba  
Salvador  
41820-011  
Tel: 55 (71) 4002 2010

Med-Lar Internações Domiciliares - Salvador  
Av. ACM, 3591  
4. Andar
Iguatemi, Salvador
40280-000
Tel: 55 (71) 3346 9688

**Salvador Emergency Services – Phone Numbers**

Public Ambulance - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department – 193

**Particular Medical Concerns**

An emergence of 47 cases of leptospirosis-associated severe pulmonary hemorrhagic syndrome (SPHS) was reported in slum communities in Salvador between 2003 and 2005. The factors responsible for SPHS and its emergence are not well understood. Outbreaks of leptospirosis occur annually in slum communities during seasonal periods of heavy rainfall.
CUIABA
The capital of the state of Mato Grosso, Cuiaba will be the smallest city in Brazil to host FWC matches and is generally regarded as one of the most challenged host cities. Located approximately 1,000 miles from the Atlantic Ocean and relatively close to Brazil’s border with Bolivia, the city is regionally isolated and not typically frequented by foreigners.

Crime: According to a Seguridad, Justicia Y Paz 2013 report, Cuiaba was listed as the 29th most violent city in the world. Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns, such as robbery, burglary, assault, and theft, as other FWC host cities. However, violent crimes, such as kidnapping, armed assault, murder, and carjacking, also occur regularly.

Civil Unrest: Civil unrest is not a major issue, although approximately 50 protestors jeered FIFA Secretary General Jerome Valcke as he toured the Arena Pantanal in October 2013.

Stadium: Arena Pantanal

Capacity: 42,968

Built specifically for the World Cup, where it will host four matches, the Arena Pantanal occupies the site where the Estadio Jose Fragelli (a soccer stadium demolished in 2010) used to stand. Construction on additional seating, sidewalks, temporary structures, and access roads remains incomplete.

Arena Pantanal - Match Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13/06 18:00</td>
<td>Chile vs. Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/06 18:00</td>
<td>Russia vs. Korea Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/06 18:00</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/06 16:00</td>
<td>Japan vs. Colombia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation: Transportation and road infrastructure will present challenges for World Cup visitors. Cuiaba had intended to complete a light-rail train system prior to the FWC, but the project is now likely to be completed in December.

Walking is considered the best, most reliable way to get around the city and hotels, sights, and restaurants are all within walking distance of the city center.

The Arena Pantanal is located two miles (approximately three km) east of the city center and is easy to reach via taxi.

City planners have intimated that busing might be available in time for the tournament.

Hospital

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name/Address</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Rosa</td>
<td>Tel: 55 65 3618 8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Rua Adel Maluf, 119, Jardim Mariana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cuiaba Emergency Services – Phone Numbers**

- Public Ambulance - 192
- Police - 190
- Fire Department – 193

**Particular Medical Concerns**

An outbreak of 30 cases of toxoplasmosis was reported in Cuiaba in October 2011. The source of the outbreak was not determined, but toxoplasmosis is related to drinking contaminated water.
PORTO ALEGRE

Porto Alegre is located in the far south of Brazil. The city lies on the eastern bank of the Guaíba River, at the convergence point of five other rivers, which together form the Lagoa dos Patos.

**Crime:** Carjackings and robberies are an increasing problem; in 2013, the city suffered 6,473 carjackings and 18,961 robberies. Attacks on ATMs using explosives are also a growing concern. In 2013, the city saw 12 such attacks, and as of April 19, 2014, there have been 11 attacks. The attacks usually take place at banks, convenience/grocery stores, and malls and occur late at night or early in the morning. OSAC constituents have been impacted in Porto Alegre by criminal incidents and sexual assaults.

**Civil Unrest:** Porto Alegre is not immune to violent protest activity. In October 2013, eight individuals from the “Marighella” anarchist group vandalized the U.S. Consular Agency. Earlier in the year, demonstrators against rising bus fares gathered in the Centro area and began breaking windows and setting fire to buses and dumpsters. In January, peaceful demonstrators took to the streets to protest the FWC and possible public transportation fare hikes. The protest began in front of the city hall and carried through downtown, with marchers chanting “There Will Be No World Cup.”

**Stadium name:** Estadio Beira-Rio

Capacity: 48,849

Estádio Beira-Rio is located in the south of Porto Alegre on the banks of the river Guaíba. The stadium lies about two miles (3 km) from Porto Alegre’s historic city center. The Estadio Beira-Rio, set to host one round of 16 and four group matches, first opened in 1969. Redevelopment, which began in December 2012 after the announcement that it would host FWC matches, included the demolition and reconstruction of the lower tier and the construction of a new exterior and roof. Construction is scheduled to be completed in May 2014.

**Estadio Beira-Rio - Match Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/06</td>
<td>France vs. Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/06</td>
<td>Australia vs. Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/06</td>
<td>Korea Republic vs. Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/06</td>
<td>Nigeria vs. Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/06</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transportation:** Public transportation is made up primarily of buses, trains, and taxis. Public buses can be a convenient option, but their prices have been the catalyst for popular and sometimes violent demonstrations. All buses are said to pass by the stadium on the Avenida Padre Cacique. There are also

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mini-bus lines connecting downtown Porto Alegre to other neighborhoods. The train system is very limited in its coverage. Taxis are considered the best means of getting around the city.

**Hospitals**

*The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name/Address</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Hospital Moinhos De Vento  
At: Rua Ramiro Barcelos, 910 Bairro Moinhos de Vento | Tel: 55 51 3289 7999 |
| Hospital Municipal de Pronto Socorro 24h  
At: Largo Teodoro Herzl, s/nº - bairro Bom Fim | Tel: 55 51 3018 3100 |
| Hospital Cristo Redentor S/A  
At: Rua Domingos Rubbo, 20 - bairro Cristo Redentor | Tel: 55 51 3357 4100 |

**Porto Alegre Emergency Services – Phone Numbers**

- Public Ambulance - 192
- Police - 190
- Fire Department - 193

**Particular Medical Concerns**

The Yellow Fever vaccine is recommended for travelers to Porto Alegre.
**RECIFE**

Recife is the state capital of Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil. The city is well known for its urban beaches.

**Crime:** Since 2007, the state government has reduced crime levels through an initiative called Pacto Pela Vida. However, according to the 2012 census, Recife had one of the largest concentrations of favelas (slums) in the country, behind Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Salvador, and organized crime and local gangs have an active presence in the city. Recife also has one of the highest per capita murder rates in Brazil. Opportunistic street crimes, such as mugging and petty theft, will likely pose a greater travel safety concern. In March 2014, the U.S. Consulate General in Recife alerted U.S. citizens to the increased number of crimes near the Shopping Rio Mar mall. Media reported an increase in the number of armed robberies as people exited the mall and got stuck in traffic. Criminals targeted smartphones, wallets, jewelry, and purses, and there were reports of cars being stolen. Beaches in Recife should be avoided at night, and personal possessions should not be left unattended. For more information, please view the [OSAC Crime & Safety Report](#) for Recife.

**Civil Unrest:** Recife experiences periodic demonstrations, although most tend to be peaceful. During the FCC, bus drivers took part in a partial shutdown of routes on June 14, halting services on Avenida Conde da Boa Vista, Rua do Sol, and Avenida Guararape. The strike caused significant travel delays for commuters.

**Stadium: Arena Pernambuco**

Capacity: 44,248 spectators

The Arena Pernambuco, which is part of a complex featuring restaurants, shopping centers, and movie theaters, is just 12 miles (19 km) away from Guararapes International Airport. The stadium, located along the BR-408, will host five matches during the FWC, including a round of 16 match. It is over one mile (1.5 km) from the nearest public parking lot.

**Arena Pernambuco - Match Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14/06 22:00</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire vs. Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06 13:00</td>
<td>Italy vs. Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06 17:00</td>
<td>Croatia vs. Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06 13:00</td>
<td>USA vs. Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/06 17:00</td>
<td>Round of 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transportation:** Taxis are available, but buses are considered the more useful form of mass transit. The Sistema Estrutural Integrado, known as SEI, has 119 bus lines that are integrated with the subway system at 13 points throughout the metropolitan area. MetroRec, Recife's subway system, covers limited areas of the city; the stadium is two miles (three km) from Rodoviaria metro station.
Hospitals

The list of hospitals below has been compiled from open sources. This list does not represent either a guarantee of competence or endorsement by the U.S Department of State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name/Address</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Joana</td>
<td>Tel: 55 81 3216 6565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Rua Joaquim Nabuco, 200, Derby</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Unimed</td>
<td>Tel: 55 81 3231 3111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Av. Lins Petit, Nº 35, Praça Chora Menino, Ilha do Leite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Hospital Portugues de Beneficencia em Pernambuco</td>
<td>Tel: 81 3416 1122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At: Avenida Governador Agamenon Magalhães, 4760, Paissandu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recife Emergency Services – Phone Numbers

Public Ambulance - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department - 193
MANAUS

Manaus is the capital city of the state of Amazonas in northern Brazil and is situated at the confluence of the rivers Negro and Solimões. It is the only host city located in the Amazon rainforest and is Brazil’s 12th most populous city, with just over two million inhabitants.

Crime: Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns such as robbery, assault, burglary, and theft, as other host cities. Street crime is a problem, especially in the evenings and late at night. Public transportation hubs, hotel sectors, and tourist areas have the highest crime rates. Many criminals use weapons when carrying out illicit activities and crimes are often accompanied by gratuitous violence. According to the Mexican think tank Seguridad, Justicia Y Paz 2013 report, Manaus is the 31st most violent city in the world. Foreign visitors may be susceptible to targeting for certain crimes in part because visitors may be less likely to file a police report and/or return to testify at criminal proceedings should perpetrators be apprehended by police.

Civil Unrest: An estimated 100,000 demonstrators took to the streets of Manaus on June 20, 2013 during the FCC. In February, stadium workers walked off the job in protest of unsafe working conditions following the death of a worker at the stadium.

Stadium: Arena Amazonia

Capacity: 42,374

Arena Amazonia, formerly the Estadio Vivaldo, is a newly refurbished stadium in the heart of the Amazon rainforest. This arena will host four group matches during the World Cup. The Arena Amazonia is located toward the north of the city on the main road that leads from the city center to the Eduardo Gomes International Airport. The distance from Manaus city center to the airport is about four miles (seven km). There is essentially one road leading out of Manaus, so access to the city is primarily by boat and air travel. The airport will be closed during the games played in Manaus.

Manaus – Arena Amazonia Match Schedule 2014 World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/14 18:00</td>
<td>England vs. Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/18 18:00</td>
<td>Cameroon vs. Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/22 18:00</td>
<td>USA vs. Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/25 16:00</td>
<td>Honduras vs. Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation: There are dedicated monorail and bus services to and from the stadium.

Public transportation infrastructure is underdeveloped, and the city is often congested. Game days will be public holidays in an effort to keep people off the roads; however, OSAC constituents should plan on traffic congestion during the tournament.

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Hospitals

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Hospital Adventista
Rua Gov. Danilo Areosa, 139
Distrito Industrial, Manaus
Tel: 55 (92) 2123-1313

Hospital Santa Julia
Rua Ayrão, 507
Centro, Manaus
69025-050
Tel: 55 (92) 2121-9000

Manaus Emergency Services – Phone Numbers

Public Ambulance - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department – 193

Particular Medical Concerns

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends Yellow Fever and Hepatitis vaccines 10 days before arriving in the Amazon. For specific vaccination and health guidance, please visit the CDC.
NATAL

Natal the capital and largest city of Rio Grande do Norte, a northeastern, coastal state. The city has a population of around one million residents. Natal is the 21st-largest city in the country and the sixth largest in the northeastern region. It is a popular tourist destination due to its beaches, historical sites, and nature areas.

Crime: Travelers will face many of the same criminal concerns, such as robbery, assault, burglary, and theft, as other FWC host cities. Street crime remains a problem for visitors and local residents alike. Foreign tourists are often targets of crime. The incidence of crime against tourists is greater in areas near the airport, beaches, hotels, bars, nightclubs, and other establishments that cater to visitors. While the risk is greater at dusk and during the evening hours, street crime can occur both day and night, and even safer areas of the city are not immune. Expensive watches, jewelry, and electronic devices will attract unwanted attention from criminals.

Stadium: Estadio das Dunas

Capacity: 42,086

Estadio das Dunas is a newly constructed stadium for the FWC. In order for Natal to become one of the 12 host cities, the previous stadium, Estadio Joao Claudio de Vasconcelos Machado, was demolished to make way for the bigger, more modern venue. The Estadio das Dunas is located toward the south of the city, about three miles (five kilometers) from Cidade Alta and Ribeira. The stadium is directly adjacent to the BR-101, one of Natal’s main arteries, and two of the city’s major shopping centers.

Natal - Estadio das Dunas Match Schedule 2014 World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date - Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/13 13:00</td>
<td>Mexico vs. Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16 19:00</td>
<td>Ghana vs. USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/19 19:00</td>
<td>Japan vs. Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/24 13:00</td>
<td>Italy vs. Uruguay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation: The city is well connected in terms of public transportation options. Buses and taxis are prevalent. But, U.S. Consulate General Recife recommends visitors to the area avoid city buses and other public transportation, as many routes pass through high crime areas and are susceptible to robberies. Only use legitimate, well-marked taxis.

Crime on the roadways remains a problem. Travelers are advised to use caution during evening travel to evade roadside robberies that target passing and stopped vehicles. It is important that drivers pay attention to their surroundings, keep doors locked, and windows rolled up when stopped in traffic.

More information about transportation options in Natal can be found at: [http://turismo.natal.rn.gov.br](http://turismo.natal.rn.gov.br).

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Hospitals

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Natal Hospital Center
Av. Afonso Pena, 754
Tirol, Natal
59020-100
Tel: 55 (84) 4009 1073

Hospital Monsenhor Walfredo Gurgel
Av. Hermes da Fonseca, 817
Tirol, Natal
59015-380
Tel: 55 (84) 3232-7500

Natal Emergency Services – Phone Numbers

Public Ambulance - 192
Police - 190
Fire Department - 193

Particular Medical Concerns

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that all travelers over the age of nine months visiting the state of Rio Grande do Norte, including Natal, obtain a Yellow Fever vaccination. For specific vaccination and health guidance, please visit the CDC.
CURITIBA

Curitiba is the capital of the southern state of Paraná and home to nearly 1.8 million people.

Crime: Curitiba is considered one of the safer cities in Brazil. The main threat faced by travelers is petty street crime, including pickpocketing and muggings, as well as car theft and burglaries. Travelers should avoid the city’s outlying, low-income suburbs where violent crime is more prevalent. Curitiba is a compact and relatively pedestrian-friendly city. During the day, it is safe and easy to walk around, but travelers should take extra precautions at night.

Civil Unrest: Curitiba is not a hotspot for protest activity, but demonstrations do occur. On April 30, 300 demonstrators protested the FWC, demanding health and safety improvements. Protests are usually non-violent, but travelers should avoid areas of protest activity in order to reduce the risk of exposure to incidental violence. Protestors have congregated in the Rua das Flores area. Rua das Flores and Luiz Xavier Avenue together make up an area called Rua VX de Novembro, a major pedestrian and commercial stretch in the city center. Other protests have taken place near the Palácio Iguaçu, the legislative assembly building located in the Civic Center neighborhood.

There have also been multiple labor strikes at the Arena da Baixada stadium. In February, more than two-thirds of the venue’s 1,300 employees were absent from work, demanding a pay increase. In April, dozens of electrical technicians and cleaning workers went on strike over unpaid wages. As a result, stadium construction has suffered numerous delays.

Stadium: Arena da Baixada

Capacity: 41,456

Address: Rua Buenos Aires 1260, Água Verde, Curitiba 80250-070

The Arena da Baixada is still under construction but is said to be near 90 percent complete and projected to be finished by mid-May. However, officials have stated that there was not enough time to install the necessary equipment to boost cellular data services at Arena da Baixada, meaning fans are unlikely to be able to access the Internet on their cellphones inside the stadium. The stadium will host four matches in the group stage but no additional matches. The stadium is centrally located, a 30 minute walk south from the city center and just 5-10 minutes from Avenida Sete de Setembro, one of Curitiba’s main avenues.

**Arena da Baixada - Match Schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16/06</td>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Iran vs. Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/06</td>
<td>19:00</td>
<td>Honduras vs. Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06</td>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Australia vs. Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/06</td>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Algeria vs. Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Fan Fest

Curitiba’s Fan Fest will be at Pedreira Paulo Leminski, an outdoor concert venue in Bairro Abranches, a residential district in the northern area of the city. Curitiba’s Fan Fest venue has a capacity for approximately 20,000 people. Police suspect that most crime will occur at or around the Fan Fest site, and police will have a mobile command center set up at the Fan Fest (as well as outside the stadium) to process petty crimes complaints.

Transportation: Curitiba’s Afonso Pena International Airport (CWB) is one of busiest airports in the country and services all major Brazilian cities. The airport is located approximately 11 miles (18 km) southeast of the city center, a roughly 30 minute ride in ideal circumstances. However, travelers should anticipate delays and leave plenty of time to reach their destinations. Airport renovation is ongoing, but much of it is so far behind schedule that anticipated upgrades, such as expanded boarding areas, better access roads, and enhanced food courts, will not be ready until March 2016. There are no major security concerns related to the airport, but travelers should generally remain alert to the risk of theft and robbery in the terminals.

Curitiba’s main bus terminal and train station, with frequent connections to São Paulo, is located about 1.5 miles (2.5 km) east of the stadium. Bus 203 runs from the city center and bus terminal to the stadium but will take roughly the same amount of time as walking.

Public transportation is not recommended at night and travelers should opt for taxis or private drivers. U.S. Consulate General Sao Paulo highly discourages hailing taxis off the street because some are illegal and can put riders at risk of armed robbery or express kidnapping. Instead, most hotels, restaurants, and businesses will have contact information for taxi services and can call a taxi for travelers. Taxis at the airport are considered safe, and travelers should use cooperativos (radio taxis), which are blue and white. Regular taxis, which are orange, can also be hailed outside the airport, but they tend to demand higher rates. Do not expect your driver to speak English. If possible, before entering a taxi, obtain the name of the taxi service and the license plate number.

More information on transportation is available here.

Hospitals

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Name</th>
<th>Hospital Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Santa Cruz</td>
<td>Avenida Batel, 1889 - Curitiba - PR Phone: (41) 3312-3000 <a href="http://www.hospitalsantacruz.com/">http://www.hospitalsantacruz.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Nossa Senhora das Graças</td>
<td>Rua Alcidez Munhoz, 433 – Mercês – Curitiba/PR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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